This paper investigates how market structure a¤ects e¢ ciency and several dimensions of liquidity in an asset market. To this end, we generalize the searchtheoretic model of …nancial intermediation of Darrell Du¢ e et al. (2005) to allow for entry of dealers and unrestricted asset holdings.
Introduction
In many markets, trade is facilitated by intermediaries, e.g., dealers, market-makers, specialists. The degree of market power that these intermediaries have is commonly viewed as a key determinant of the liquidity of the market in which they operate. Recently, several regulations have been introduced to foster competition in …nancial markets. 1 The available evidence suggests that these reforms have had an impact on trading costs and have also a¤ected the incentives of …nancial intermediaries to make markets.
In order to understand precisely how the organization of the market in which an asset is traded a¤ects the standard …nancial measures of liquidity, we generalize the Motivated by the recent regulatory changes, we center our analysis around the e¤ects of changes in the dealers'market power.
We …nd that a reform which reduces the dealers'market power can quite naturally lead to lower trading costs, higher trade volume, and a net entry of dealers, in line with the evidence provided by James Weston (2000). 2 Our model can also generate multiple steady-state equilibria, suggesting that markets with similar structures may di¤er considerably in terms of their liquidity outcomes.
The environment
Time is continuous and goes on forever. There are two types of in…nitely-lived agents: a unit measure of investors and a large measure of dealers. There is one asset, one perishable good called special good, and a general consumption good de…ned as numéraire. The asset is durable, perfectly divisible and in …xed supply A 2 R + . Each unit of the asset produces a unit ‡ow of special good. There is no market for the special good. The numéraire good is produced and consumed by all agents. The instantaneous utility function of an investor is " i u(a) + c, where a 2 R + is the consumption of special goods (which coincides with the investor's asset holdings), c 2 R is the net consumption of the numéraire good (c < 0 if the investor produces more of the numéraire good than he consumes), and i 2 fL; Hg indexes an idiosyncratic component, with " L < " H . The function u(a) is continuous and twice di¤erentiable, with u 0 > 0 and u 00 < 0. Each investor receives an idiosyncratic preference shock with Poisson arrival rate . Conditional on the preference shock, the probability the investor draws preference type i 2 fL; Hg is i , with L + H = 1. Dealers' instantaneous utility is simply c, their consumption of the numéraire good. Dealers who choose to participate in the market also incur a ‡ow cost > 0 which represents the ongoing costs of running the dealership. All agents discount at rate r > 0.
Participating dealers have continuous access to a competitive asset market. An investor can adjust his asset holdings only through a dealer whom he contacts at random and bilaterally with Poisson rate . Once they have made contact, the dealer and the investor negotiate over the quantity of assets that the dealer will acquire on behalf of the investor and an intermediation fee; they execute the transaction and part ways.
The rate at which investors contact dealers, , is a continuously di¤erentiable function of the measure of active dealers in the market, . Investors contact a dealer faster when the measure of active dealers is larger , i.e.,
(1)=1 = 0 and 0 (0) = 1. We capture the notion of competition for order ‡ow by assuming that the rate at which dealers contact investors, ( )= , is decreasing in .
Equilibrium
We restrict our attention to steady-state equilibria where the price of the asset in terms of the numéraire good, p 2 R + , is constant over time. The value function of an investor with a preference type i 2 fL; Hg who holds a quantity of assets a, V i (a), satis…es
where fjg = fL; Hgnfig. The investor enjoys a utility ‡ow " i u(a) from holding portfolio a. He receives a new preference type with instantaneous probability j and enjoys a capital gain V j (a) V i (a). Upon contacting a dealer, with instantaneous probability ( ), the investor buys a i a (sells if negative) and pays the dealer an intermediation fee, i (a) 2 R + . The quantity traded, a i , and the fee, i (a), correspond to the Nash solution of the bargaining problem,
where 2 [0; 1] is the dealer's bargaining power. After some calculations,
where
and
is a weighted average of current and future expected marginal utilities. The weight on the current marginal utility decreases with trading delays, 1= , and with dealers'bargaining power, .
The free entry of dealers implies
where n ji denotes the measure of investors with preference type i who hold the quantity of assets a j , given by
where a H ( ; ) and a L ( ; ) are implicitly de…ned by (1) . According to (3) the expected net pro…t of dealers, ( ; ), must be 0 in equilibrium. The expected ‡ow revenue of a dealer equals the expected intermediation fee he earns when he trades for a random investor, an event which occurs with Poisson rate ( )= .
Finally, p is determined by the market-clearing condition P i;j n ij a i = A, which using (4), can be written as
Condition (6) equates the aggregate demand for the asset by investors (the left-hand side) to the asset supply.
A steady-state equilibrium is a list f(n ij ) ; (a i ; i ( )) ; ; pg satisfying (1)-(6). It is easy to show that lim !0 ( ; ) = 1 and lim !1 ( ; ) = for all > 0. So an equilibrium with > 0 exists provided that > 0.
Liquidity and welfare
In order to isolate the direct e¤ects of changes in the bargaining power, , on the dealers' incentives to participate in the market from the general equilibrium e¤ects that operate through the implied changes in the investors' asset holdings, we …rst assume u(a) = a 1 =(1 ) with ! 0. In this limiting case a i = A "
is independent of , speci…cally, a L ! 0 and a H ! A= H . From (6), the asset price is
not charge a fee when they sell) and
So for given the trading cost HL increases with . From (3) the net expected pro…t of a dealer is
The function ( ; ) is strictly decreasing in , so the equilibrium is unique; is strictly increasing in so that d =d > 0. This last result implies that HL increases with .
Finally, the total volume of trade,
, increases with . The following proposition summarizes the e¤ects of on the di¤erent dimensions of liquidity.
Proposition 1 Assume ! 0. An increase in dealers'bargaining power raises trading costs ( HL ), reduces trading delays (1= ( )) and increases trade volume (V).
Assuming r 0, steady-state welfare is X j2fL;Hg n Hj " j a H . If a planner could choose the measure of dealers in the market, he would pick the unique that solves
(It is easy to check that the planner would choose the same portfolio allocations implied by the equilibrium.) By using ( ; ) = 0 to solve for , the following proposition shows that the optimal allocation can be implemented provided that dealers enjoy a degree of market power that gives them enough incentives to participate in market-making. 
